Chinese companies are urging Canadian academics to set up separate businesses to bypass federal research-security screenings, potentially putting sensitive Canadian data at risk, a China scholar told MPs during a committee meeting.
Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, a senior fellow at the University of Ottawa’s Institute for Science, Society and Policy, raised the concern during an Oct. 29 meeting of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Science and Research, where MPs were examining threats to Canadian scientific research, including foreign interference, technology theft, and espionage.
“I’m very concerned about the workarounds that some professors are using,” McCuaig-Johnston told the committee.
McCuaig-Johnston, who previously served as executive vice-president of the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC), said some Chinese technology companies, such as China’s state-backed Huawei, are advising professors to set up private businesses they can then use to circumvent research security rules.
“There are Chinese companies, like Huawei, that advise professors that they don’t need to be concerned about the screening of their research, they can just set up a separate company and work with Huawei,” she told MPs.
“Huawei will help them to do that, and they can use their students in working through that separate company.”
McCuaig-Johnston then raised concerns about what she described as considerable “movement” between Huawei and university professorships or teaching positions.
“I am somewhat concerned about the amount of movement between Huawei and professorships or people teaching at universities,” she said, adding that it appeared to be “a pretty fluid situation.”
She said her concerns were partly rooted in China’s indigenous innovation policy, which she described as focused on acquiring technology and scientific knowledge from abroad.
Canada’s Rules
The federal government introduced its Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern in May 2024, building on research-security guidelines introduced in 2021.
The earlier National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships established a framework for assessing and mitigating potential national security risks in federally funded research partnerships. The 2024 policy added specific funding restrictions for research projects advancing designated sensitive technology areas when researchers involved in the work have affiliations with, or receive funding or in-kind support from, organizations identified by the government as posing potential national security risks.
The policy covers research projects that are funded via Canada’s three federal research granting agencies and the Canada Foundation for Innovation.
McCuaig-Johnston said Canada’s research-security measures have not been consistently adopted across universities, creating an uneven approach to protecting sensitive research.
“It means it’s not a level playing field among the universities when some universities play fast and loose with relationships with companies like BGI [Beijing Genomics Institute],” she said.
She cited genomic research as an example of a sensitive area in which Canadian institutions could expose information to foreign entities.
McCuaig-Johnston said genomic data collected from individuals in Canada was being sent to China for processing. She did not specify how much data was involved or identify the institutions participating in the arrangements.
In addition to stronger screening around technological research and genomic data, McCuaig-Johnston called for stronger protections in other sensitive research fields, including quantum computing and nanotechnology.
“These are areas that really need to be protected, and I think we should be more protective of them than we are now,” she said, while adding there has been “tremendous progress” in protecting Canadian research security in recent years.
Recruiting Foreign Researchers
During the committee hearing, Conservative MP Vincent Ho also raised concerns regarding the Canada Global Impact+ Research Talent Initiative.
The federal program, announced on Dec. 9, 2025, provides up to $1.7 billion over 12 years to attract and support more than 1,000 international and expatriate researchers. Recruitment is focused on fields including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, clean technology, advanced materials, and defence and dual-use technologies.
Ho questioned how the government could ensure that incoming researchers had no undisclosed foreign funding obligations or affiliations that could pose security risks, noting that Canadian citizenship is not required for international recruits.
McCuaig-Johnston said she understood the initiative was primarily focused on attracting researchers from the United States, where many were interested in moving to Canada. She said she was not particularly concerned about their motivations, provided existing research-security safeguards were properly applied.
She described the screening systems established by federal research agencies as comprehensive and a “gold standard for the world,” but said incoming researchers with connections to China warranted particular scrutiny, particularly if the ties are to Chinese military institutions.
“Certainly, if they had any such connections in China, I would be raising big red flags all over the place, so to speak,” she said. “But you know, I think that’s something that with this program they would want to take a special look at.”
In a follow-up response, McCuaig-Johnston said the existing screening process used by federal granting agencies was capable of identifying affiliations with foreign military universities and research institutes, and could be applied to researchers recruited through the initiative.
