Commentary
It’s no secret that Canada is eager to diversify its economy away from the United States.
High tariffs and foreign policy disagreements are putting distance between the North American neighbors. Amid these tensions with Washington, Ottawa has viewed China as an alternative market and trading partner.
Trading With China: A Win-Win?
The most serious concern is not ordinary diplomacy or trade, but rather covert activity that may influence Canadian decisions, marginalize or silence critics, or acquire sensitive information on Canadian national security, technology, and other critical matters.
China is well known for leveraging economic or trade relationships to gain influence with policymakers and other well-placed people.
The January 2026 agreement-in-principle, for example, includes a reduction in China’s combined tariffs on Canadian canola seed to 15 percent from approximately 85 percent, as well as market access for several Canadian agricultural and seafood products. That’s not insignificant.
In return, Canada will allow an initial annual quota of 49,000 Chinese electric vehicles at a most-favored-nation tariff rate, with a pathway for more affordable models.
This is a big deal. Farmers gain cheaper, greater access to China’s market, and Canadians gain access to cheaper electric cars. Official trade data also show that the Trans Mountain Pipeline expansion has helped Canadian crude oil reach Asian markets, with China a major beneficiary.
It looks like a win-win for both nations.
China Comes With Risks
But there’s a problem.
Allowing China to penetrate deeply into one’s economy comes with risks. It may involve intellectual property theft, or it may open the door to excessive Chinese influence over trade, strategic industries, democratic institutions, and national security.
In fact, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has identified the Chinese regime as Canada’s greatest counter-intelligence threat. CSIS cites efforts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its organs to target government institutions, businesses, universities, political figures, and Chinese diaspora communities. Tactics range from cyberoperations and information manipulation to covert recruitment, pressure on individuals who criticize the Party, and the use of front organizations to build and expand influence.
The United Front Network: Influence and Control
The CCP’s United Front Work Department is well known as such an organization. It leverages relationships with overseas organizations, community leaders, professionals, academics, and political figures to advance Beijing’s interests.
How wide is its net?
A 2026 Jamestown Foundation study identified 575 organizations in Canada linked to the united front system. That’s too many to ignore, and it’s almost certain that the CCP has some influence with some of the members of those organizations.
But at the same time, it doesn’t mean that every member in every organization takes orders from Beijing. Nonetheless, the most serious concern is covert activity that may influence Canadian decisions, marginalize and silence critics, or even acquire sensitive information about Canadian national security, technology, elections, and other critical information.
For instance, in January 2025, the Hogue Commission’s report concluded that foreign interference by China had undermined public confidence in Canadian elections. Even though the inquiry concluded that such influence didn’t change outcomes in the 2019 or 2021 federal elections, it still matters because the attempts to interfere were determined to have occurred.
Beijing’s Reach: Universities, Research, and Freedom of Expression
Canadian universities are another arena in which the balance between international cooperation and national security matters. Chinese students and scholars contribute enormously to Canada’s research and cultural life; their presence is not, in itself, a security threat.
However, CSIS has warned that foreign interference can reach academic institutions and that the Chinese state seeks access to Canadian intellectual property and emerging technologies. Students who criticize Beijing’s policies may also face intimidation or pressure extending to relatives abroad.
Are organizations, funding relationships, or personal connections being used to conceal CCP direction, suppress dissent, or influence policy?
It’s certainly reasonable to think so, at least to some degree, which poses legitimate concerns for everyone. Canada must investigate credible evidence of CCP influence, but do so without stigmatizing Chinese Canadians. The truth is that many are themselves targets of pressure from the CCP. Protecting those communities is part of protecting Canadian sovereignty.
Police Cooperation and Transnational Repression
Indeed, Canada’s sovereignty has come into question with reports of Chinese overseas police stations operating without permission in Canada. CSIS explicitly identifies transnational repression—including surveillance, intimidation, threats, and pressure on family members—as a form of foreign interference.
That conduct challenges the principle that people living in Canada are protected by Canadian law, not subject to political enforcement by a foreign government. Apparently, Beijing has little worry about the consequences of exercising coercive authority beyond its borders.
But even authorized coordination between Canadian and Chinese police authorities raises eyebrows. Canada’s Parliament has questions about the contents and depth of cooperation outlined in a purported 2026 memorandum of understanding between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Chinese authorities.
Members of Parliament requested disclosure of its terms and purposes, legal limits, oversight arrangements, and protections against political abuse. Canadians need to know about any information-sharing provisions and safeguards in place for their personal data. Unfortunately, the optics of the agreement aren’t reassuring, to say the least.
Who Controls Canada’s Strategic Minerals?
Perhaps more disturbing is the fact that Beijing’s influence also extends into essential defense supply chains.
Strategic mineral mining operations—such as Newfoundland and Labrador’s Beaver Brook Antimony Mine—are owned by China Minmetals Rare Earth Group, a Chinese state-owned enterprise. Antimony has applications in ammunition, alloys, and other industrial and defense technologies.
Fortunately, the mine suspended operations indefinitely in January 2023. Nevertheless, the case illustrates why foreign ownership of strategically important mineral assets deserves scrutiny.
Looking at Canada’s relationship with China going forward, Ottawa must decide where the nation’s future lies, and how close it wishes to get to the Chinese communist regime.
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
