The Neocloud and Transshipment: How China Sneaks AI Compute From the World

By Anders Corr
Anders Corr
Anders Corr
Anders Corr has a bachelor’s/master’s in political science from Yale University (2001) and a doctorate in government from Harvard University (2008). He is a principal at Corr Analytics Inc. and publisher of the Journal of Political Risk, and has conducted extensive research in North America, Europe, and Asia. His latest books are “The Concentration of Power: Institutionalization, Hierarchy, and Hegemony” (2021) and “Great Powers, Grand Strategies: the New Game in the South China Sea” (2018).
November 19, 2026Updated: November 19, 2026

Commentary

China seeks artificial intelligence (AI) technology from the United States and through third jurisdictions, including the Netherlands, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Hong Kong, and the UAE.

AI chip access, for example, is typically done through cloud computing, smuggling, or transshipping via third countries. In some cases, the chips are repackaged or mounted into cheap servers to exploit loopholes in export control laws. 

Legal loopholes through which China accesses AI tech often persist due to lobbying by corporations like Nvidia, Oracle, and ASML that benefit from the loopholes, or direct foreign influence by countries seeking to expand their AI footprint.

Peter Wennink, the former CEO of ASML, admitted to lobbying against export controls. “I think in Washington, maybe they sometimes thought, that Mr. Wennink, maybe he’s a friend of China,” he said. “No. I’m a friend to my customers, to my suppliers, to my employees, to my shareholders.”

But when one’s customers are in China, and one sends tech to China that can proliferate throughout its economy and enable its AI capabilities, then there is arguably little difference between being a “friend of China” and a “friend to my customers.” 

While AI chips were previously smuggled in small quantities by individuals, cross-border AI compute is now more often delivered via the “neocloud” or smuggled in server shipments that can include thousands of chips at a time. AI servers hosted in an approved country’s neocloud can legally be leased and used from China.

Examples of export-controlled chips are Nvidia’s Blackwell graphics processing units (GPUs) and South Korea’s high-bandwidth memory (HBM) chips. ASML in the Netherlands produces chipmaking machines, including older versions that it legally sells to customers in China. Even older semiconductor tech gives China’s economy a boost that fuels its military and AI spending. Yet as recently as June, the Dutch government lobbied the United States against export controls.

The most recent news is about the billions of dollars worth of Nvidia chips allegedly made accessible to China via a Singaporean company called Megaspeed. The firm’s sister company in Malaysia bought $4.8 billion worth of advanced Nvidia equipment, including AI chips, over the past three years. China’s Alibaba was a major purchaser of the compute. Alibaba allegedly acquired chips in addition to those it legally accessed through the neocloud.

Alice Huang, according to employees, reportedly ran Megaspeed as recently as May. U.S. intelligence suspects she is a Chinese spy. She romanced Nvidia’s CEO at the time, Jensen Huang. He led the company’s lobbying efforts, which reached the highest levels of the U.S. government, against U.S. export controls on AI chips.

Megaspeed and Alice Huang deny wrongdoing, but authorities in the United States, Singapore, and Malaysia are investigating. Reportedly, Megaspeed’s headquarters in Singapore is practically empty, and its offices in Australia and Malaysia appear to be not much more than shells.

Nvidia said it stopped selling to Megaspeed last year, but it reportedly continued to do so. Separately, Nvidia reportedly accounted for 34 percent of AI-accelerator shipments to China in the first two quarters of 2026. Despite Jensen Huang’s resignation on Nov. 12, the Nvidia case demonstrates an unacceptable lack of due diligence on Nvidia’s part, as well as loopholes in U.S. and partner law and its enforcement.

A photo shows NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang with a woman confirmed by a Reuters source to be Alice Huang, in Taipei
A photo shows NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang with a woman confirmed by a Reuters source to be Alice Huang in Taipei, Taiwan, released on June 7, 2024. (Obtained by Reuters/via Reuters)
Companies in China likely task their U.S. and other foreign suppliers with finding ways around export controls. China’s state media pushes the idea. South Korea’s HBM chips are useful to AI compute and are export-controlled. The memory has reportedly increased in price in the smuggling market from hundreds of dollars each last year to as much as $4,000 this year.

As noted in China’s state-controlled media, Global Times, “For South Korean chipmakers to maintain or expand their presence in China, they will need to offer Chinese customers their most advanced products. Finding a way to overcome US restrictions that prevent advanced HBM exports to China is therefore essential to that effort.”

Although it is illegal to ship HBM to China individually, South Korean HBM can be mounted into low-end server processors that are not export-controlled because of their low processor speeds. After shipping to China, heat is carefully applied to remove the HBM. The rest of the server processor can be thrown away. The HBM chips are then reportedly repurposed, primarily by Huawei customers for use in China’s AI systems. This is an obvious loophole in U.S. and South Korean export control laws that should be closed. 

Instead of looking to benefit from U.S. loopholes, the South Korean government should strengthen its own export control laws to ensure that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is not further empowered with South Korean technologies. South Korean companies have spent millions of dollars on U.S. lobbying to allow the shipping of chipmaking machines to their factories in China. They should stop such lobbying immediately.

A new U.S. law should make lobbying more difficult by requiring greater disclosure from companies that export to China and other adversary nations. Their lobbying arguably represents the paid will of the CCP, which is unfree. The U.S. Constitution was not meant to protect the CCP’s spending, which results from taxation without representation.

China casts a wide net for its AI tech. In another Singapore case last year, Singaporean authorities raided 22 locations and arrested nine people suspected of selling Supermicro and Dell servers with Nvidia chips to a company in Malaysia.

In May, Taiwan authorities arrested three people for allegedly transshipping Nvidia chips in Supermicro servers through Japan and Hong Kong. Japan has strict customs enforcement, so getting the chips through suggests they could be smuggled through many other jurisdictions as well.

In May, Thailand targeted “origin-tagging” fraud amid suspected smuggling of AI chips through the country. In recent months, China has reportedly attempted to lease neocloud compute in Europe. 

The U.S. Commerce Department issued an interim rule on Nov. 16 that increases licensing for supplying advanced AI chips to data centers that supply large quantities of compute to companies headquartered in adversary countries including China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, plus about 20 other arms-embargoed countries.

Additionally, it requires companies to obtain licenses to ship advanced AI chips to Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brazil. These stronger restrictions add to existing restrictions on countries such as China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.

The rule is a move in the right direction, but several exceptions still exist, such as recommender systems and more limited neocloud access (companies could potentially split their compute requirements across unrelated providers).

Enforcement has lagged, and the new rule is arguably too little, too late. U.S. export controls on chips and the neocloud have long been a leaky sieve of a regulatory regime considered by some experts to be impossible to enforce on a global level. The U.S. government should prove them wrong. New U.S. laws (four bills are in the pipeline) should end China’s (and other adversary nations’) access to AI tech.

The four bills are: the AI Overwatch Act, which gives Congress more power over AI chip exports; the Chip Security ⁠Act, which requires firms to track locations of AI processors; the Match Act, which pressures US allies to restrict the sale to China of semiconductor manufacturing equipment; and the Remote Access Security Act, which gives the Commerce Department tools to stop China’s firms from leasing Nvidia compute in the neocloud.

Far tougher laws are needed. U.S. law on China and other adversary nations should extend U.S. export controls extraterritorially to all countries so U.S. companies are not put at a disadvantage. Companies from adversary countries banned by the United States, and any company globally in which they invest, should be banned from acquiring AI equipment anywhere in the world.

U.S. law should block all companies globally from sending advanced and legacy chip-making machines to adversary nations like China. Even older semiconductors power the economies and militaries of adversary countries that want to wipe out democracy. 

Where U.S. laws lag in restricting tech development in China, U.S. partners should impose their own laws. The European Union, United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, and Singapore, for example, have insufficiently or too slowly restricted China’s access to their territories’ AI and other semiconductor tech.

U.S. allies should proactively step into the breach with their own tougher laws where U.S. legal loopholes exist. The United States and our allied democracies should feel free to use non-market tools to outcompete the regime in China on global markets, as the regime is both totalitarian and communist. It is a non-market economy and often advantages its companies through these means.

The privilege of free trade should only be extended to the free. AI tech should be controlled by the democracies alone if democracy is to survive the new era of superintelligence.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

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